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CRIMINAL LAW - STATU'l;'ORY INTERPRETATION - POSSESSION OF GAMBLING DEVICES AS MISDEMEANOR-In raiding a warehouse, a sheriff found
forty-six dust-covered slot machines with payoff slots covered and containing no
payoff mechanisms. There was no evidence that the machines had ever been
used. Appellant had rented the warehouse for the purpose of storing the machines.
His testimony showed that he owned the machines and was a dealer engaged
in buying and selling them. He was indicted under a statute reading: "Any
person who, by himself or with another, shall keep, maintain, employ, or carry on
any lottery or other scheme or device for the hazarding of any money or valuable
thing shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 1 On appeal from a conviction for keeping
and maintaining a slot machine, held, affirmed. Merely possessing such a machine
is unlawful under the statute, whether for storage or for any purpose whatsoever.
Davis v. State, (Ga. App. 1948) 49 S.E. (2d) 173.
Courts are not in agreement on the proposition that possession or keeping of
gambling devices, where there is no showing of actual or intended use for
gambling, is an offense.2 The conflict of authority can be based in part upon
differences in the specific language of the various applicable statutes,8 but it is
surprising to find that statutes not differing materially in phraseology have been

1 Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) § 26-6502. For definitions of the word "keep," as
related to gaming see 23 WORDS & PHRASES 501,509; 38 C.J.S., Gaming, pp. 55, 57, 155.
2 See 38 C.J.S., Gaming, pp. 161, 164, and collection of cases in 162 A.L.R.
n88 (1946), where it is also stated that mere possession of gambling devices was not an
offense at common law.
·
8 Hurvich v. State, 230 Ala. 578, 162 S. 362 (1935), held mere possession to be
unlawful under a statute declaring it to be unlawful " ••. for any person ••• to possess,
keep, own, set up, operate, or conduct .•• any gambling device••.•" Accord: State v.
Jaskie, 245 Wis. 398, 14 N.W. (2d) 148 (1944), where the statute forbade any person
to permit a gambling device"•.• to be set up, kept, managed, or used, or any gambling
or betting therewith...•" The court found that use of the disjunctive, "or," rendered
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given such markedly divergent interpretations. 4 Though some courts base their
decisions on a consideration of the authority of the legislature to make possession
of gambling devices an offense, 5 in general the reason for dissimilar interpretations
of relatively similar statutory language may be found in the consideration by
various courts of the nature of the evil sought to be remedied by the statute. Many
courts feel that the legislative purpose is to penalize active gaming only; 6 while
other courts feel that the legislature intends to reach the very possession of the
means of gambling in order to prevent any possible use:7 This latter view, however,
is not reconcilable in many instances with statutory language which does not
specifically forbid possession or ownership as such. Under similar statutory language, a result opposite to that of the principal case was reached by another court
through careful application of the ordinary canons of construction, s~ch as
ejusdem generis, construing the word in its relation to other language of the
statute as well as according to its common meanings. 8 If a word such as "j{eep"
has two possible meanings it would seem that some such principle of statutory
construction must be applied in order to determine its meaning within a given
context. The court in the principal case merely assumed that the statutory
word, "keep," meant possess, citing as authority a case which gave no proper
consideration to the matter of construction.9 It is submitted that courts should
be wary of summarily interpreting such language to create a new crime unless
the legislature has specifically expressed itself on the matter.
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use of the device unnecessary to commission of the offense. See also People v. Gravenhorst, (N.Y. City Ct. of Spec. Sess. 1942) 32 N.Y.S. (2d) 760; State v. Appley, 207
S.C. 284, 35 S.E. (2d) 835 (1945); 162 A.L.R. 1188 (1946), ~nvolving similar
statutes. But see Chapman v. Aggeler, 47 Cal. App. (2d) 848, 119 P. (2d) 204
(1941), holding use to be necessary under a statute declaring it unlawfnl to have in
possession " ... any ... contrivance upon the result of action of which money .•. is
staked ... and which is operated ..• ," because of the use of the word "is." Accord:
Atlas Finance Corporation v. Kenny, 68 Cal. App. (2d) 504, 157 P. (2d) 401 (1945);
Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co. v. Lansing, 291 Mich. 589, 289 N.W. 265
(1939), holding possession alone not to be unlawful where the statute read: "Any person
who shall .•• keep or maintain ••. any game of chance ... used for gaming ... shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor." See also State v. Jones, 218 N.C. 734, 12 S.E. (2d) 292
( I 940), holding use of the device necessary under a statute reading: "It shall be unlawful
.•. to operate or keep in ... possession •.. for the purpose of being operated..••"
4
Sable v. State, 48 Ga. App. 174, 172 S.E. 236 (1933), holding possession
unlawful under the same statute involved in the principal case. But see Haycraft v.
Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 568, 49 S.W. (2d) 314 (1932), holding that possession is
not unlawful under statute using the following language:".•. whoever ••• shall set up,
carry on, keep, manage, operate or conduct ••. contrivance used in betting ... shall be
fined .•••"
G Babel v. State, 173 Ill. 19, 50 N.E. 322 (1898). The reasoning in this case was
questioned in Chapman v. Aggeler, 47 Cal. App. (2d) 848, 119 P. (2d) 204 (1941).
6
Rawls v. State, 70 Miss. 739, 12 S. 584 (1893).
7
Babel v. State, 173 Ill. 19, 50 N.E. 322 (1898).
8
Haycraft v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 568, 49 S.W. (2d) 314 (1932), supra,
note 4, in which the ejusdem generis doctrine was applied to the statute to reach the
result that "keep" in juxtaposition to the other words meant more than mere possession.
9
Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 18 S.E. (2d) 622 (1942).

